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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

NFAC #6975-80/1  
23 October 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment  
National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM : National Intelligence Officer for Africa

SUBJECT : Warning Report: Sub-Saharan Africa  25X1

1. Action Requested: None; the attached report is for your information.  25X1

2. Background: Community representatives and specialists met on 21 October 1980 with the NIO/AF as chairman. The attached report has not been coordinated with the other participants, but is being circulated to them. If they feel their views have been misinterpreted, or if they have significant additional concerns, I'll report further to you.  25X1

  
L. Gray Cowan

Attachment  
NFAC #6975-80

This memorandum is UNCLASSIFIED  
when separated from Attachment.

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NFAC #6975-80/1

SUBJECT: Warning Report: Sub-Saharan Africa

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## WARNING REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA\* No. 24

In general, the concerns expressed at our September Sub-Saharan warning meeting continue with no significant changes. Specifically:

HORN OF AFRICA

We continue to see a great likelihood of more hostilities on the border region. They will result primarily from Ethiopian efforts to gradually and systematically improve their military capabilities in the Ogaden and move closer to the border while eliminating pockets of WSLF activity. There is general agreement that a residual regular Somali military presence continues in the region. While analysts do not believe that Ethiopian military moves are intended to inhibit implementation of the US-Somali access agreement, it seems obvious to the NIO that the political impact in the US of military activity along the border is not lost on Ethiopian planners. We continue to expect [redacted] 25X1  
[redacted] that Ethiopia will make greater 25X1  
use of the anti-Siad Somali Salvation Front as an instrument to exacerbate tribal differences within Somalia and to increase military pressure on the Somalis. [redacted] 25X1

Concern was expressed that Siad, while not immediately threatened, is probably experiencing more political problems and pressures than he has previously. These stem from further military setbacks in the Ogaden (both to the Ogadeni guerrillas as well as to Somali forces), continuing decline in the economic situation--exacerbated by the cut off of Iraqi petroleum--and intensified clan politics. We expect growing criticism of Siad among the military and political leadership, particularly among those elements who question the wisdom of cutting back on activity in the Ogaden in exchange for the access agreement with the US. Some analysts expect this criticism to increase if Siad is unable to demonstrate significant tangible benefit to Somalia from this agreement. While not discussed at the meeting, Siad's recognition of these problems probably led, at least in part, to his declaration of the state of emergency. [redacted] 25X1

LIBERIA

Analytical concern over the situation and prospects for stability in Liberia have heightened since our previous meeting. The principal cause

\* This memorandum is one of a series produced monthly by NIO/AF. Its purpose is to review possible developments in the short-term future that would be damaging to US interests. Obviously, many of these developments will not occur in the time frame or in the manner suggested, or will not occur at all.

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for this concern is the serious and increasingly difficult financial situation facing Liberia and the inability or unwillingness of Liberian leaders to take steps to ameliorate problems in this area. Analysts anticipate that as these financial difficulties increasingly affect the populace and the rank and file of the army, pressures both from within and outside the ruling People's Redemption Council will lead to deterioration of the currently relatively stable political situation and provide advantage to those elements more likely to radicalize the Liberian revolution. This would provide opportunity for those outside elements, e.g., the Soviets, Cubans, Ethiopians and Libyans, who would be all too willing to involve themselves in Liberia. [ ]

25X1

ZIMBABWE

Most analysts continue to be optimistic about Zimbabwe's short term stability. They point to progress in forming a new national army, the absence of demoralization within the white population, Mugabe's firm dealing with lawlessness and the fact that the Tekere affair has not apparently inflamed ZANU radicals. The NIO, however, while basically optimistic himself, believes that the Tekere affair might yet cause serious problems for Mugabe. Tekere's trial, now scheduled for November 3, would serve as an opportunity for radicals within the ZANU establishment (the so-called "Super ZANU") to stir up trouble and present Mugabe with a very delicate and difficult problem. [ ]

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OTHER

-- Analysts view Chad as being in a state of continuing disintegration. Concern was expressed regarding expanded Libyan military involvement in that beleaguered nation. [ ]

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-- Uganda continues to be inherently unstable with little reason for optimism that the elections now scheduled for December will change the situation greatly. [ ]

25X1

-- While most analysts do not see Kaunda's rule in Zambia threatened, he reportedly took the coup reports seriously enough to shake up the military leadership. This situation requires close monitoring. [ ]

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-- Similarly, in Sudan, while Nimeiri seems unthreatened, his illness has caused a popular perception of weakness and "Sudan afloat". This situation also requires close monitoring. [ ]

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